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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Washington

"A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM WITH RESPECT

TO ESCAPEES FROM THE SOVIET ORBIT: PHASE B"

WARNING

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
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

"A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM WITH RESPECT
TO ESCAPEES FROM THE SOVIET ORBIT: PHASE B"

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY

This program was approved by the Board at its 17th meeting, January 15, 1953. Your attention is called to the new wording, approved by the Board, for paragraph 2 on page 1.


Charles E. Johnson
Secretary to the Board

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

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"A National Psychological Program With Respect
To Escapees From The Soviet Orbit: Phase B"

1. Psychological Objectives.

a. To reduce the power and influence of the USSR by application of affirmative psychological pressures upon the enslaved populations in order to undermine and contribute toward destruction of control of the Kremlin.

b. To strengthen and enhance the power of the non-communist world by the progressive acquisition and psychological utilization of escapees^{1/} from the Soviet orbit.

2. Requirements for Program Development.

Within the framework of NSC 86/1 and with due regard for conditions in specific areas, particularly Berlin and Hongkong:

a. Take action to insure that escapees from the Soviet orbit will receive asylum and will be assisted in achieving a constructive life in the free world; and to this end enlist the support of governments of the free world.

b. Emphasize the inducement to escape of Soviet orbit citizens who can make a worthwhile psychological contribution either by publicity based upon the fact of escape or by participation in psychological programs.

c. Give reasonable priority to exploitation of the psychological potential of escapees except where jeopardy or substantial loss to intelligence operations is clearly demonstrable.

1/ In this Plan "escapee" is an inclusive term meaning a national of a Soviet orbit state who has escaped from control of the Soviet orbit and who refuses to return to such control. "Soviet orbit" includes USSR, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, "German Democratic Republic", Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Tibet, "Chinese People's Republic", "Korean People's Republic", and any nation which may be added to the Soviet sphere of influence.

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d. Encourage, assist and guide the efforts of groups of escapees (particularly recent escapees) to increase popular dissidence behind the "iron curtain," to expose Soviet tyranny and to vitiate the effect of Communist propaganda throughout the world.

(1) Assist in the development of dynamic, cooperative leadership within groups of escapees, consistent with U. S. policy.

(2) Encourage independent groups of escapees to indict the Soviet system and its individual leaders more effectively.

e. Utilize the military potential of escapees to derive optimum psychological advantages in the present situation and to provide for appropriate military use in the event of war.

f. Through appropriate training and education of escapees, representing various levels of educational background, produce effective anti-Soviet leaders and workers, and develop and sustain favorable psychological attitudes within all levels of these groups.

Attachment:

ANNEX A - ANALYSIS

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a. A preponderance of available evidence indicates that large numbers of people in Eastern Europe and the USSR are not in sympathy with the regime. Within the past decade thousands of people have expressed their objection actively by resistance and escape. Resistance has led in most cases to execution or incarceration and escape has often led to a life of hardship in the West. Expression of resistance passively is generally ineffective and costly for the individual. The usual personal solution is the submersion and concealment of dissident feelings as necessary to achievement of the best way of life possible under an oppressive system.

b. Escape from oppression must have as its counterpart escape to something better. It appears that many people in the Soviet bloc, particularly the peoples of the USSR, believe that they will be handed back to the Soviets if they attempt to flee. Prospective escapees are often beset by doubts concerning their material fate abroad, apparently based upon rumors fostered by the regime of suffering among those who have fled. Most important, the security measures which Soviet and satellite authorities have instituted and are steadily increasing render escape difficult and make it unlikely that the flow of escapees will rise above its present order of magnitude.

c. The fact of escape itself is a demonstration of opposition to the Soviet system which has an important psychological impact on both sides of the "iron curtain." Even if media inspired by the U. S. do not publicize identities, escape stimulates disaffection in the oppressed homeland because the departed individual is a symbol to the community as one who chose freedom. Local political leaders

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and military commanders are held responsible for the escapee's "crime." Permanent stigma is placed upon them which requires more effort on the part of the surveillance apparatus. Application by the Soviet authorities of the rule of collective guilt may result in administrative disruption of the units concerned, whether military, political or industrial. The Soviet system must live with a continuing refutation of its claims to popular support. In the free world, escapees are the most articulate instruments to counter communist propaganda. The efforts to isolate the Soviet-controlled populations from foreign contamination, and the bitter attacks on U. S. efforts to promote escape lead inevitably to the conclusion that Soviet leadership fears this type of U. S. action.

2. National Policya. NSC 20/4

Para. 19a: "To reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations."

Para. 20a: "To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR."

b. NSC 135/3

Para. 1c: "Without deliberately incurring grave risk of general war induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence and so to foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system . . ."

c. NSC 86/1

Para. 1: ". . . The long-range objective of U. S. policy towards defectors is to contribute to the achievement of general U. S. objectives and aims with respect to the USSR as stated in

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NSC 20/4, particularly by placing the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power through threatening the regime's control of its population. Corollary objectives to be sought by a defector program are: (a) benefits to intelligence and related activities; (b) propaganda use and value; (c) denial of valuable personnel to Soviet and satellite regimes; (d) spread of increased disaffection and confusion within Soviet and satellite regimes; and (e) availability of personalities possessing background and knowledge the acquisition of which would be in the national interest."

Para. 2: ". . . The United States should, by both conventional and unconventional means, encourage and induce the defection of the maximum possible number of persons from all parts of the USSR. . ."

Para. 5: ". . . No effort should now be made to encourage general defection from the satellite states. However, present efforts to induce the defection of key personnel from satellite countries (including Communist China and East Germany) should be continued and, if possible, expanded."

Para. 6: ". . . The turning back or improper handling of any defectors from countries under communist control would have a very unfavorable effect on the entire defector program. Accordingly, the United States should use its influence with the governments of countries bordering on the Soviet bloc in an effort to insure that they grant asylum and proper treatment to any defector."

d. NSCID 13

Para. 1: "It is in accord with the best U. S. tradition to endeavor to protect and assist those fleeing from persecution. Under present conditions it is in the important interests of national security that defectors be welcomed and assisted in obtaining a degree of personal and economic security and made to feel that there

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is a place for them in a free society. Defectors represent the best sources of information and intelligence in the Soviet world. The most effective agents to destroy the communist myth of Soviet paradise are defectors who are able to tell the truth about conditions of life behind the iron curtain."

e. Permissive Legislation:

(1) Title II, Section 21 of Public Law 51, 1951, provides for the enlistment of not more than twelve thousand five hundred aliens in the Regular Army. These enlistees are eligible to apply for U. S. citizenship.

(2) Section 101 (a)(1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952 authorizes the use of up to \$100,000,000 to form selected persons who have escaped from certain Communist-dominated countries into elements of the military forces supporting NATO and "for other purposes."

3. Programs for Use of Escapees

a. All use of escapees should be designed primarily to weaken the power of the Soviet bloc in accordance with approved national objectives. Whether individuals are used to pierce the veil of Soviet secrecy in order to obtain intelligence necessary for the defense of the free world, to perform underground psychological missions behind the iron curtain, or in propaganda activities in the free world, they make a valuable contribution toward our objectives. Groups of escapees form a basis for appeals to their enslaved compatriots, they contain candidates for positions of leadership in the ideological struggle, and they constitute a pool from which individuals can be recruited for special tasks.

b. Military Use

(1) Peacetime:

(a) A program for the formation of military units

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from Soviet orbit escapees might permit utilization of a large number of these individuals. It would have a significant psychological impact behind the iron curtain, particularly in the armed forces, and for this reason should contribute to the achievement of the national objectives of NSC 20/4.

(b) There appear to be several ways of carrying out such a program although the most careful planning and execution would be required to minimize political and military difficulties. It is impossible to estimate how many escapees would volunteer for military service, but in any event it is obvious that small projects could be started with limited numbers of escapees which would also serve to make the pilot operation administratively manageable. Since the program has at the outset primarily psychological objectives, the concept rather than the order of magnitude is of the essence. It has been argued that residual escapees from World War II could provide large numbers of recruits for such units; however, resettlement programs have integrated the overwhelming majority of these people which would probably discourage large-scale voluntary enlistment.

(2) Contingency:

(a) In the event of war or a situation requiring extreme measures the United States should be prepared to make use of escapee forces as guerrilla and conventional units. German experience and their mishandling of a dynamic opportunity in Byelo-Russia, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus should stand as an object lesson to the free world. To a somewhat lesser extent, Allied experience with the Polish Army of Liberation under General Anders during World War II

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demonstrates the vital potential of this kind of force. 1/

(b) The knowledge that one's countrymen are fighting in significant numbers under their own native leaders against the regime has a demoralizing impact on the will to fight. The soldier who throws down his arms and goes over is no longer a deserter but an escapee to freedom in the eyes of the democratic world. He leaves the service of the oppressor and joins the forces of democracy. Since he is welcomed into the ranks of his already free countrymen, he is not just a prisoner of war as one captured against his will. Soviet technique to discourage desertion actually complements this strategy by making defection a crime subject to severe punishment. It is made known that deserters will be executed when recaptured, and the political officers attached to the units of the line stress the futility of escape.

(c) If war should come, cooperation with escapee forces would demolish the false communist propaganda line

1/ As a matter of historical record, there was a significant element of support for the German cause against the Stalinist Government in the population of the USSR. Large numbers of soldiers deserted the Red Army in the first year of the German-Soviet War. In some areas of the Soviet Union, particularly the Ukraine, Byelo-Russia, the Baltic States and the Caucasus, German invaders were welcomed as liberators. Standing on doctrines of racial superiority, the German occupation introduced a policy of brutality and ruthless exploitation. When the Nazis saw the folly of this policy (though they would not give up their fallacious racial doctrines) it was too late to effect a change. Soviet psychological warfare had already solidified most of the people in the struggle for survival or had at least convinced them of the utter hopelessness of their situation. At the outbreak of World War II it was the almost universal opinion of German officers familiar with Eastern Europe that Germany could not win without the help of the peoples of the USSR themselves. Soviet officer and enlisted prisoners of war stated repeatedly that Germany would have defeated the Red Army if a true policy of liberation had been adopted.

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which accuses the U. S. of espousing Hitler's doctrines of racial superiority. It would contribute toward the real meaning of the U. S. policy of self-determination for all peoples without the necessity of adopting narrow qualifications. Failure to recognize the military-psychological potential of escapees from the Soviet bloc in time of war has proved, and would prove, to be a historical mistake of the greatest magnitude.

4. Conclusions:

It is in the interest of the United States to:

- a. Convince the peoples of the Soviet orbit that escapees will not be forcibly repatriated and that they will be assisted in achieving a constructive life.
- b. Emphasize the inducement of escape from the Soviet orbit for its psychological value.
- c. Encourage and guide the efforts of groups of escapees to make a greater psychological contribution.
- d. Derive optimum psychological advantages from the military value of escapees.
- e. Produce effective anti-Soviet leaders and workers among escapees.

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